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Using Qualtrics software, we designed an experiment
that would randomly assign the participant to one of
four distinct vignettes. One for each of the possible
combinations between negligence, ignorance,
manufacturer parts, and third party supplied parts. We
incorporated an attributional manipulation check to test
significant differences between the groups regarding
blame. Respondents were asked, “In your opinion, who
or what is to blame for the faulty sensors.? Assign
blame among the following (up to 100% for one if you
believe that party is fully responsible).” Possible
response options were 1.) Omega Motors, 2.) Outside
Supplier, 3.) Bad Luck, or 4.) Large product line
(increasing the chance of product defects). The final
attribution is representative of a Task Difficulty
attribution found in classical attribution theory. We
then assessed reputational and purchase intention
changes. Participants were then given the following
instructions, “Now imagine that the injured owners and
families of the deceased owners are pursuing a class
action civil lawsuit against Omega Motors, and you
have been selected to serve as a juror evaluating the
case.” After reading the statement, respondents were
asked to reflect of Omega’s legal liability, recommend
damages, and managerial remedies.
The	negative	reputational	effects	of	a	recall	will	be	
greater	when	the	recall	is	attributed	to	negligence,	
rather	than	ignorance.
Consumer	purchase	intentions	will	be	more	
negatively	affected	by	a	recall	attributed	to	
negligence,	rather	than	ignorance.
Civil	damages	proposed	as	a	result	of	a	recall	will	
be	greater	when	the	recall	is	attributed	to	
negligence,	rather	than	ignorance.	
The	negative	reputational	effects	of	a	recall	will	be	lower	
when	the	recall	is	attributed	to	supplier	negligence,	rather	
than	organizational	negligence.	
Consumer	purchase	intentions	will	be	more	negatively	
affected	by	a	recall	attributed	to	supplier	negligence,	rather	
than	organizational	negligence.
Civil	damages	as	a	result	of	a	recall	will	be	lower	when	the	
recall	is	attributed	to	supplier	negligence,	rather	than	
organizational	negligence.	
Abstract Hypotheses
Logo
Automotive manufacturers have a fiduciary duty
to the consumer not only to provide
transportation from point A to point B; their duty
encompasses much more than that. The
manufacturer is expected to design, produce, and
market vehicles that protect the driver and
passengers from bodily harm in the case of an
accident. However, sometimes the manufacturer
fails in this duty. When this happens, it is
imperative that the manufacturer is clear about
where and what went wrong. The manufacturer is
expected to find an amicable solution to the
problem and implement change where needed.
We seek to look at what can go wrong, and has
gone wrong before, and ask consumers to reflect
upon these occurrences and to give a final
judgment on who should be held accountable for
these injustices. Additionally, we looked at how
parts made internally or by an outside supplier
change can the consumer’s views.
Research Questions
Following	previous	research	found	on	both	
manufacturer	recalls	and	attribution	theory	
I	have	outlined	the	following	research	
questions	to	be	answered:
Absent	of	any	
brand	specific	
bias,	does	a	
consumer	
differentiate	
between	a	
recall	caused	
by	ignorance	
and	a	recall	
caused	by	
negligence?
How,	if	at	all,	
does	the	
difference	in	a	
part	made	by	
the	
manufacturer	
or	an	outside	
supplier	affect	
the	results	
seen	in	
question	one?
Who	is	to	
blame	in	
these	cases	
and	how	
should	
damages	be	
assigned?
After controlling for respondent employment status, gender,
age, education, ethnicity, lawsuit experience, recall
experience, and prior or current employment at an
automobile manufacturer or supplier, the main effects of
negligence vs, ignorance and supplier vs. manufacturer were
statistically significant predictors of the combined outcomes.
Significant differences in outcome variables were also
observed based on age and prior recall experience.
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, predicted that reputational damage,
model purchase intentions, and civil damages, respectively,
would be higher when the recall is attributed to negligence,
rather than ignorance. Significant mean differences were
observed for reputation change, model purchase intentions,
but not civil damages based on the negligence vs. ignorance
condition. Thus, the data support Hypotheses 1 and 2, while
Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6
predict that reputational damage, model purchase intentions,
and civil damages would be higher when the recall is
attributed to the automobile manufacturer, rather than a
supplier. Significant mean differences were not observed for
reputation damage, but were observed for model purchase
intentions and civil damages. Thus, Hypotheses 5 and 6 were
supported, while the data did not support Hypothesis 4.
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